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affecting the result in this case. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that this Petition be 
granted. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY & HOWARD 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Petition is submitted 
in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R. D. ANDRUS, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH and its DEPARTMENT 
OF HIGHWAYS, SALT LAKE COUNTY, a 
political subdivision of the State 
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THIS BRIEF, is submitted under Rule 76(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and in this typewritten form, pursuant 
to leave granted by this Court on October 16, 1975. 
NATURE OF THIS CASE 
This matter involves three consolidated actions for 
damages against the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, and 
Gibbons & Reed Construction Company, based on flooding damage 
which occurred in two storms, during a state highway construction 
project. By order of the Court [R.59], and pursuant to Rule 
42(b), the issue of liability was tried separately, reserving 
for later proceedings, the question of damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND IN THE SUPREME COURT ON APPEAL 
The Trial Court entered judgment against the State of Utah 
and in favor of Plaintiffs. This judgment was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court. Defendants do not seek a rehearing on this part 
of the judgment. However, the extent of the State's liability 
is involved in a constitutional inverse condemnation question. 
The Inverse Condemnation Count IV of Plaintiffs1 complaint, 
was dismissed before trial [R.27]. For the purpose of fully 
protecting their rights on appeal, Plaintiffs appealed from 
the order of dismissal. This Court granted a motion of Defen-
dants-Respondents to dismiss the appeal. 
Provided, however, that this shall not 
prejudice the right of the Plaintiff-
Appellant, to challenge the ruling 
herein appealed from if a later appeal 
is filed from subsequent final rulings 
in this case. [R.47] 
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On subsequent appeal, the Plaintiffs urged that their 
property had been taken and damaged in violation of the 
Utah and Federal Constitutions [App.Br. 37]. The majority 
of this Court did not discuss or render an opinion on 
Plaintiffs Point III (Inverse Condemnation). The dissenting 
opinion delt solely with this issue. 
On the question of effective denial of Plaintiffs' right 
to a jury trial, as provided by the Constitution and laws of 
this state, the disposition of the case was as follows: 
A special verdict was returned by the Jury upon Interrogatories 
submitted to it. Matters pertinent to Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Petition for Rehearing, were found by the Jury upon special 
Interrogatories submitted to it. The Jury found that Salt 
Lake County unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition 
in the utilization of its storm drain system and that all Plain-
tiffs, except Richard Grotepas who had not sued the County, 
were damaged as a proximate result. [R.723-24] In addition, 
the Jury found that Salt Lake County was negligent in failing 
to provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for the 
highway project and that Plaintiffs suffered damage as a proximate 
result thereof. [R.728] Finally, the Jury found that Gibbons 
& Reed Construction Company was negligent in failing to take 
reasonable precautions to protect the project during construction 
and that this negligence proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs. 
[R.728] An amended Order and Judgment was entered on May 15, 
1974, under which the Court ruled that the County of Salt Lake 
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and the Gibbons & Reed Construction Company were not liable 
for any damages suffered by the Plaintiffs. The judgment of 
the District Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants now seek a rehearing on the 
question of Inverse Condemnation, and on matters pertaining 
to the effective denial of a jury trial regarding liability 
of Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed Construction Company. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs in this action are all homeowners residing 
in an area immediately west of Wasatch Boulevard near 4500 
South in Salt Lake County [Ex.6(p)]. This general area is 
located on the base slopes of Mount Olympus, which rises 
sharply from the valley floor as part of the Wasatch front. 
[Ex.l(p)] The Defendant, Gibbons & Reed Construction Company, 
was a contractor with the State of Utah, for construction of 
the highway project in question. [R.1775-1777, Ex.6(p)] 
The facts concerning the flood and its damage to Plaintiffs, 
are adequately set out in the majority opinion of this Court 
and in Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief on Appeal. The disposition 
of this case in the Trial Court and in the Supreme Court on 
Appeal, also constitute the facts forming a basis for the present 
Petition for Rehearing. Since these facts are specified under 
a previous heading, it can serve no useful purpose to reiterate 
them at this point. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Inverse Condemnation 
Article I, Section 22, of the Constitution of Utah, 
provides: 
Private property shall not be taken 
or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
Amendment V, of the Constitution of the United States 
of America, provides: 
• . .; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
The Federal Constitution does not refer to damage but since the 
taking of "private property" includes personal propertyd' the 
effect of the two constitutional provisions is identical for 
the purposes of the case at bar as to the personal property 
taken. (2) Plaintiffs further contend that there was a taking 
of real property for a period of time sufficient to bring the 
(1) Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U.S. 148 U.S. 312, 37 L.Ed. 345 
(1893) 
Armstrong v. U.S. 364 U.S. 40, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1554 (1960) 
Causby v. U.S. 75 F.Supp. 262, 109 Ct.Cl. 768 (1948) 
(Compensation for personal property destroyed by flooding) 
Patrick v. Riley 209 Cal. 350, 287 P.455 (1930) 
State v. Leeson 323 P.2d 692, 697 (1958) 
Anderson Cattle Co. v. Kansas Turnpike Authority 308 P.2d 
172, 176, 180 Kan. 749 (1957). See also, Van Alstyne, 
Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope 
of Legislative Power 19 Stan.L.R. 727 at 739 Note 50. 
(2) The position of plaintiffs on this issue is to be distin-
guished from State Road Commission v. Brown 531 P.2d 1294 
(Utah) (1975). The Utah Eminent domain statute refers to 
real property but neither the State nor the Federal Con-
stitution make such a distinction. 
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case within the protection of the Federal Constitution, but 
that question does not arise under the State Constitution, which 
explicitly covers damage. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution was 
originally a limitation only upon the powers of the Federal 
Government.(3) But, with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, its provision for just compensation for private property 
taken for public use became fully operative as a restriction 
upon the powers of the several states and their political sub-
divisions as a substantive aspect of the due process of law 
which the states are required to extend to all persons within 
their jurisdiction. '^) 
The majority opinion in this case made no reference what-
ever to Point III, The State and County Should Be Held Liable 
In This Case Under the Doctrine of "Inverse Condemnation", in 
Plaintiffs1 Brief. [Plaintiffs1 Brief Pg. 34-39]. 
The Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to evaluate 
the dissenting opinion, which was filed 32 days after the majority 
opinion was filed. This fact alone constitutes a substantial 
(3) Barron v. Mayor and City Council 32 U.S. (7 Peter) 
243 (1883). 
(4) Griggs v. Allegheny County 369 U.S. 84, 90, (1962). 
Chicago B & Q.R.R. v. Chicago 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
See, also, Van Alstyne, Supra, at P.730;Calif. Water 
& Tel. Co. v. Railroad Commission 19 F.Supp. 11, 12 
(1937). 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reason for granting a rehearing. In the event the learned 
dissenting opinion of Judge Bullock has caused the Court to 
wonder whether it should at this time give further consideration 
to the great weight of authority on this fundimental proposition, 
we urge the Court to also reexamine the reasons expressed in 
Plaintiffs1 Brief at Pages 37-39. 
In harmony with Judge Wade's dissenting opinion in Fair-
clough vs. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d, 417, 354 P.2d 105 
(1960), many states have judically expressed the view, that 
private property shall not be taken for public purposes without 
just compensation as a matter of constitutional requirement 
(5) 
without effectuating legislation. v ' 
In a very recent case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico 
has ruled that the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity 
is no longer a valid defense in tort suits against the State 
or its political subdivisions. New Mexico thus becomes the 12th 
state to judically put an end to a state's immunity for tort 
liability. (Hicks v. New Mexico 9/26/75) 
The court explains that the original 
justification for the doctrine—that the 
sovereign can do no wrong—is a 'feudalistic 
contention1 that is no longer valid. Moreover, 
eliminating the state's immunity will not 
result in an intolerable financial burden 
since adequate insurance can be secured to 
eliminate possible liability. Placing the 
financial burden upon the state, which is 
(5) See footnote 6 to dissenting opinion in case at bar. 
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able to distribute the losses throughout the 
populace, is more just and equitable than 
forcing an injured individual to bear the 
entire burden alone. There are no longer 
any conditions or circumstances that could 
rationally support the doctrine, the court 
concludes, and its continued validity has 
been the cause of a 'great degree of in-
justice.1 (Page 2159) 
It is interesting to observe that the New Mexico Supreme 
Court argument urging placing the financial burden upon the 
State as more equitable than forcing an injured individual to 
bear the entire burden alone, is the same argument Plaintiffs 
have urged in support of the doctrine of inverse condemnation. 
(Plaintiffs1 Brief Paragraph IV, Pg. 38). 
The Utah Legislature in 1965, recognized the injustice of 
sovereign immunity in this field by the passage of the Act 
under which this Court affirmed the judgment against the State 
in this case, t6' but the limitation on the amount of recovery 
is arbitrary and unjust. The legislature, having waived 
sovereign immunity, this Court is not bound by a legislative pro-
vision which attempts to illegally amend the Constitutions of Utah 
and the United States to allow private property to be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation above $50,000.00 
for all the property that may be damaged on one occasion. Inter-
pretation of the Constitution is not a legislative matter. That 
function is reserved to the judicial branch. This Court has the 
(6) 7A U.C.A. 63-30) 
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solemn responsibility to protect the citizens of this State 
and their property as the Courts of most other states have done. 
One additional element in this case that should not be over-
looked is the fact that the damage to Plaintiffs1 property is not 
simply the result of an incident connected with, or flowing from 
the public project. The jury found: 
The highway project of the State of Utah 
including the storm drain system, was 
unreasonably defective or dangerous. 
Plaintiffs, should be afforded the right not to be deprived 
of their property above the statutory limitation without due 
process of law, particularly, when such damage is the result 
of the negligence of the sovereign. 
If sovereign immunity had not been waived in this State, 
the force of judicial consensus on the proposition that the 
constitutional provision concerning the taking of private property 
for public use is self-executing, now requires a fresh look 
under present circumstances. As Judge Bullock so profoundly states, 
"the proper inquiry is whether the clear right granted by the 
Constitution has been abrogated or denied by the legislation." Is 
stare decisis of this Court so essential and the private property 
of individual citizens injured by the neglect of the sovereign 
so expendable as to prevent this Court from breathing life into 
the clear meaning of the Constitution? The Plaintiffs in the 
case at bar furnish this Court with an opportunity to respond to 
the clarion call for justice and equity in a field where Utah 
finds itself increasingly lonesome. Progressive thought bears 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the fruits of sound development. It would be refreshing if 1975 
marked the confluence of the flow of Utah protective justice for 
its citizens into the mainstream of constitutional fulfillment. 
We conclude with the words of the well-known commercial "even-
tually, why not now?" 
B. Trial By Jury 
Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
In capital cases, the right of trial 
by jury shall remain inviolent. In 
courts of general jurisdiction, except 
in capital cases, a jury shall consist 
of eight jurors. In courts of inferior 
jurisdiction, a jury shall consist of 
four jurors. In criminal cases, the 
verdict shall be unanimous. In civil 
cases, 3/4ths of the jurors may find 
a verdict. A jury of civil cases shall 
be waived unless demanded. [Emphasis 
added]. 
In this case, the jury by unanimous verdict found that the 
flood of August 17, 1969, injured the property of the Plaintiffs 
as a proximate result of an unreasonably created defective or 
dangerous condition, created by Salt Lake County in the utili-
zation of its storm drain system [Finding B(l)] and [R.723]. 
The jury further found that Salt Lake County was negligent in 
failing to provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for 
the highway project [Finding I][R.728]. 
The jury further found, that the Contractor, Gibbons & 
Reed Construction Company, was negligent in that it failed to 
take reasonable precaution to protect the project during con-
struction and that this negligence, proximately caused damage 
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to P l a i n t i f f s [Finding J ( l ) & K][R.728]. 
The Trial Court declined to enter judgment against Salt 
Lake County and Gibbons & Reed Construction Company. 
Upon appeal, the Plaintiffs contended, that since the 
special verdict against both Salt Lake County and Gibbons & 
Reed Construction Company was supported by substantial evidence, 
refusal of the District Court to enter a judgment thereon, in 
effect, denied the Plaintiffs of their right to a jury trial 
[Plaintiff-Respondents1 Brief 27]. This Court affirmed the 
judgment with respect to Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed 
Construction Company. 
Taking or damaging property of another by negligent acts 
is so clearly an action at common law as not to require cita-
tions. The statutes (7> and Civil Rules of Procedure<8) of this 
State protect the right of jury trial in harmony with the State 
Constitution. Here, a jury made a decision on substantial evidence 
as indicated in Plaintiffs1 Brief on Appeal at Pages 20 through 
the first half of Page 34. This Court did not attempt to disguish 
its holding in First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Ezra C. Lundahl, 
Inc., 22 Utah 2d, 433, 454 P.2d, 886, 889 (1969): 
But when a party has demanded a trial by 
jury he is entitled to have the jury find 
the facts, and it is not the trial court's 
prerogative to make findings inconsistent 
therewith and thereby defeat the effect of 
the jury's findings. 
(7) 9 U.C.A. 78-21-1. 
(8) Rules 38, 39. 
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The Court now states: 
We find no statutory duty on the part 
of the County to supply drainage 
facilities for the State Highway 
Project. 
After discussing the evidence in a limited manner, the Court 
further states: 
The County, by giving its permission, 
to the State to empty the highway drain-
age system into the County sewer, would 
not create liability on the part of the 
County for the acts of the State or its 
contractor in failing to provide safe-
guards to prevent obstruction of the 
sewer system, nor was the County respon-
sible for the action of the State in 
emptying a large conduit into the County's 
smaller conduit. In our review of the 
record, we find no foundation for the 
assessment of liability upon the County. 
Plaintiffs concede that the County had no statutory or 
other duty to supply drainage facilities for the.State Highway 
Project. But, when it consented to participate in that project, 
it acquired a duty as a party in the project, to refrain from 
committing the sewer system to the unreasonable creation of a 
defective or dangerous condition. The jury so determined. 
[R.723-24] The opinion of this Court makes no reference to this 
finding but states only the subordinate finding; "Salt Lake 
County was negligent in failing to provide reasonable adequate 
drainage facilities for the highway project". Salt Lake County 
participated in the creation of a dangerous and defective con-
dition and then failed to provide reasonably adequate drainage 
facilities for the highway project, which it had agreed to 
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furnish. It should not escape the liability for its action which 
proximately caused damage to the blameless citizens in the 
endangered area. 
Plaintiffs1 position appears to have not been fully under-
stood or resolved. The material fact found by the jury on the 
participation of Salt Lake County in the creation of a defective 
and dangerous condition was overlooked or misconstrued. The 
judiciary should not deny any litigant the right of trial by 
jury in a case appropriate to such a mode of trial. 
In dealing with the claim of Plaintiffs against Gibbons & 
Reed, this Court simply stated the findings of the jury and 
concluded with the statement: 
. . . f we find no basis upon which to find 
that the contractor was liable to the Plain-
tiffs. 
Cases cited in support of this conclusion, do not reach the 
point raised by Plaintiffs. Those cases all support the 
general proposition that a contractor is not liable if he 
has merely carried out plans, specifications and directions 
given him, at least when plans are not so obviously dangerous 
that no reasonable man would follow them. This was the holding 
of the Utah Supreme Court in Leininger v. Stearns - Roger 
Manufacturing Company. 17 Utah 2d 37, 41, 404 P.2d 33, 36. 
But that same case at Page 41, of the Utah Report, and Page 36 
of the Pacific Report stated: 
However, each case must be decided on the 
basis of its own facts and seldom are two 
cases identical. 
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In the Leininger case, the employment contracts specified that 
the contractor would have no responsibility for the adequacy of 
the equipment furnished by the employer and the suit was with 
reference to an exhaust fan that had been installed for the 
employer according to the directions of the manufacturer. In 
the case at bar, the contractor, by contract with the State, was 
responsible for damage "on account of or in consequence of any 
neglect, in safeguarding the work". By the same contract, 
Gibbons & Reed Construction Company agreed to be responsible 
"for all damage or injury to property of any character, during 
the prosecution of the work, resulting from any action, omission, 
neglect or misconduct in his manner or method of execution of 
the work". 
The jury found Gibbons & Reed was negligent in failing to 
take reasonable precaution to protect the project during con-
struction, and that such negligence proximately caused damage 
to Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs are not contending that Gibbons & Reed is 
responsible for damage to property due to design failure or 
failure to follow plans and specifications. The contractor 
was negligent in failing to protect the project during 
construction in matters for which it was contractually res-
ponsible, and in matters within its own discretion. The 
evidence is overwhelming that the contractor knew of the 
flooding danger (Plaintiffs1 Brief Pg.31). The State did 
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not purport to instruct the contractor when to remove the 
protective barrier from Wasatch Boulevard or when to line 
the barrow pits or when to protect the inlets to the storm 
sewer. These were matters within the discretion of Gibbons 
& Reed. Expert testimony revealed that it would not be good 
practice to leave the lead drains, which fed into a closed 
drain, unprotected during construction, that a clog-free drain 
cover could be used and, "ditchriders" could be used to insure 
that the intakes remained unobstructed (Plaintiffs1 Brief 
PP.32, 33). The employer hired no ditchrider, but left the 
project without such protection during the storm in question. 
The order of construction of protective measures was its 
responsibility. This is substantial evidence to support the 
jury's finding of negligence. The Court has merely cited the 
evidence of things done right by the contractor. The weighing 
of the evidence is for the jury when the evidence is substantial. 
The case of Marian Municipal Water District v. Penninsula 
Paving Company, 94 P.2d 404 (Cal.) expressed the general 
rule as above-stated, but held at Page 406: 
. . . but where the contractor departs 
from the contract, plans, or specifications, 
or goes beyond them, or performs the work 
specified in an improper, careless, or 
negligent manner, which results in injury 
to adjacent property, then he is responsible 
in damages for the tort he has committed. 
[Emphasis added]. 
In the case we now consider, the contractor specifically con-
tracted to assume all damage resulting from failure to protect 
the project during construction. 
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Wood v. Foster & Creighton 235 S.W. 2d 1, (Tenn.) states: 
It is a well-settled rule in this state 
that a contractor constructing a public 
improvement for a public authority is not 
liable to a private property owner for the 
resulting damage where the contractor acts 
in accordance with the public authority's 
orders and is not itself guilty of negligence 
in the manner in which it does the work. 
[Page 3]. 
Southwest Construction Company, Inc., v. Ellis, 342 S.W. 
2d 485, 488 (Ark.) quotes other cases but specifically recognizes 
that when a contractor is guilty of negligence or willful 
tort, he is responsible for his damages. Here the contractor 
was negligent in failing to protect the project during construction 
and such negligence resulted in damage to the Plaintiffs. If 
the law of this state protects a contractor from liability 
for his own negligence, committed in violation of his contract, 
simply because he otherwise follows plans and specifications, 
the decision of this court should so specify with certainty. 
The statement by the Court: 
Gibbons & Reed having performed its contract 
with the State in accordance with the plans, 
specifications, and directions given it by 
the State with a reasonable degree of skill, 
we find no basis upon which to find that the 
contractor was liable to the plaintiffs. 
does not satisfy this requirement. We believe the Court 
has failed to consider the particular question presented 
by the appeal and has disposed of the liability of Gibbons 
& Reed Construction Company upon generalities which are 
admitted by Plaintiffs. 
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CONCLUSION 
The issue of inverse condemnation, as raised by appellants, 
was not resolved by the Court. Material facts ascertained and 
decided by the jury were overlooked or disregarded, and the 
issues raised were not fully understood and resolved. A 
rehearing should be granted. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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